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MILITARY SUPPORT TO FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS:  
RETHINKING ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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<p>Over the last twenty years a series of nuclear, biological, and chemical accidents and incidents have unveiled a disturbing aspect of the modern age--the potential for manmade disasters of horrific proportions. In response to this threat a new mission area called Consequence Management (CM) has evolved. The Department of State is the lead federal agency for dealing with foreign CM, but it is the regional CINCs who are charged with planning and responding to CM emergencies. In an era of declining assets, it is questionable whether the CINCs and their major subordinate commanders can meet the rigorous demands of CM and still achieve their operational and training requirements. Forming a Joint-Interagency Task Force for CM (JIATF-CM) is one way to bridge the gap. By relieving the CINCs of the burden of immediate response and providing assistance in CM planning and coordination, a standing JIATF-CM may be a wise investment. With NBC terrorist attacks and regional conflicts a near certainty, maximizing our defenses through a more efficient use of limited operational assets is very much in our nation's interest.</p>			
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Abstract of

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## MILITARY SUPPORT TO FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: RETHINKING ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

### *CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT*

Over the last twenty years a series of events have unveiled a disturbing new aspect of the modern age--the potential for manmade disasters of horrific proportions. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, the World Trade Center bombing, and the Aum Shinriko's sarin gas attack in Tokyo each highlight the emerging dangers of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) accidents and incidents. The US Government (USG) has responded through a series of actions, many of which impact heavily on the warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINC). One of the most significant of these actions was the 1996 directive of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) that each geographic CINC "...develop a Consequence Management plan, take the lead in coordination and execution of the plan, and conduct liaison with other federal disaster agencies and international relief organizations to coordinate memoranda of understanding."<sup>1</sup>

While a logical and workable solution, placing responsibility for foreign Consequence Management (CM) operations on the CINCs poses two potentially serious problems. First, it burdens each CINC with the same ill defined, tremendously complex, and heavily taxing mission. Second, by focusing on the warfighting CINCs for CM planning, coordination, and response, the decision implicitly links US operational forces with CM response. In an era of declining defense investments, expanding mission requirements, and an increasingly complex international political environment, placing this responsibility on the CINCs may raise as many problems as it solves while missing an opportunity to enhance our nation's total CM capability.

This paper addresses the problem of roles, functions, and responsibilities for military CM operations in foreign lands. Toward that end the paper will briefly outline what CM is, how CM doctrine has evolved thus far, and which direction emerging CM doctrine is heading. It will then suggest an alternative CM structure to optimize foreign CM options and performance, to lessen burdens on warfighting CINCs, and to enhance coordination between foreign and domestic CM planners. Specific CM actions relating to terrorist activities will not be addressed in this paper.

### *DEFINITIONS*

The first task is to define consequence management. Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted definition, even within the US Government. An early (1982) definition suggests CM is specifically tied to overcoming the consequences of a terrorist act.<sup>2</sup> The definition has broadened since then, but not uniformly. The National Security Council (NSC) description of CM centers on the "essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate suffering from disasters and catastrophes." These may include transportation and communications; food, water, and shelter; mass care, health and medical services; urban search and rescue; and hazardous materials and energy. The emphasis is to "preserve life and minimize suffering."<sup>3</sup>

Within the Department of Defense (DOD), the precise definition of CM is a moving target. In the 24 November 1997 draft of CJCS INSTRUCTION 3214.01, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) describe CM as "interagency assistance to mitigate damage resulting from the employment of NBC weapons by national, transnational, or subnational actors or from the release of NBC contaminants due to natural disasters, failures in industrial safeguards, and other non-malicious circumstances."<sup>4</sup> By 1 May 1998 this definition had narrowed the focus of CM to

"USG interagency assistance to mitigate damage resulting from the employment of NBC/M [means of delivery] weapons of mass destruction."<sup>5</sup> The Department of State (DOS) essentially agrees with the NSC, but is looking beyond mitigation and humanitarian assistance to supporting host nations in "first responder" training and improving international reaction capabilities.<sup>6</sup>

Each definition is extremely broad. None focuses on nor excludes terrorist activity. The JCS view limits CM to the NBC realm, with the latter definition excluding all incidents and accidents not specifically tied to a NBC weapon or delivery means. In contrast, the NSC allows for a more inclusive conception of CM. No definition specifically includes or excludes humanitarian assistance or disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, but HA/DR is clearly implicit in each.

This implied HA/DR mission requires further definition if we are to understand DOD's role and responsibility in CM. According to the JCS, foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those "conducted to relieve or reduce the result of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage or loss of property."<sup>7</sup> The critical difference between CM and HA/DR is the political ramifications of the former, particularly in a terrorist situation.

#### *ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND, RESPONSIBILITIES: BACKGROUND*

Early CM planning efforts put the ball firmly in the court of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On 20 July 1979 President Jimmy Carter named the Director of FEMA as lead agent for establishing and coordinating policies for all Federal "civil defense and

civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions."<sup>8</sup> A civil emergency was defined as "any accidental, natural, man-caused, or wartime emergency or threat thereof, which causes or may cause substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of property." Many functions were transferred from DOD and the service secretaries, but the Secretary of Defense was tasked with supporting FEMA in civil defense preparedness and operations.<sup>9</sup> While this was strictly domestic and the term "consequence management" was not used, this action in the wake of the Three Mile Island emergency was clearly CM. It defined the military role as one of support and set the stage for future planning and concept development.

President Bush raised the level of awareness dramatically when, in November 1990, he declared a national emergency to deal with the expanding threat to America's security and interests posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. As before, taskings were directed at the Secretaries of State and Commerce, not the Secretary of Defense.<sup>10</sup> Four years later President Clinton reaffirmed this state of emergency, adding a nuclear threat and making the connection between weapons and delivery systems.<sup>11</sup> While military application was clearly expanding by the first use of the term "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMD) and in linking such weapons to delivery systems, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury retained primary responsibility for dealing with this threat.<sup>12</sup>

This non-military focus on CM began to shift in 1995. In Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39 President Clinton stated that the US would "give the highest priority to developing effective capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons used by terrorists." He appointed DOS as the lead agency for international terrorist incidents, with responsibility for coordinating interagency

planning and oversight of day-to-day operations falling to the Secretary of State. The President also named the ambassador "on-scene coordinator" and tasked DOS's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOD with supporting DOS efforts. OFDA and DOD were further tasked with providing assistance to foreign victims of large scale terrorist attacks. While the emphasis is on terrorist incidents, the principles of expanding US interest and DOD participation in the full range of CM activities is clearly illustrated. PDD-39 also established a dichotomy between crisis response, the defeat or arrest of perpetrators, and CM, which included everything else.<sup>13</sup>

In September 1996 the shift towards greater DOD participation was further defined. At that time Congress named the Secretary of Defense lead agent in providing federal, state, and local officials training and guidance in responding to threatened or actual WMD emergencies. The secretary was also tasked with carrying out a program of emergency response exercises over each of the following five years.<sup>14</sup>

In yet another move to deal with WMDs and the consequences of their use, in May 1997 President Clinton issued PDD-56 addressing "complex contingency operations." Although these operations are not precisely defined, they are described by analogy with other operations; none of which specifically matches DOD's definition of CM.<sup>15</sup> Still, the paper identifies the requirement to "be prepared to manage the humanitarian, economic and political consequences of a technological crisis where chemical, biological, and/or radiological hazards may be present." It goes on to state that a military response may not be the best, and that forces should not be deployed indefinitely for such operations. Furthermore, PDD-56 declares that civilian and military components must be closely integrated during planning and execution to avoid delay, reduce potential for unplanned



military expansion, and create unity of effort.<sup>16</sup> While PDD-56 seems to be going against the trend toward defining issues in terms of consequence management, the humanitarian, economic, and political problems associated with complex contingency operations easily fall within emerging CM doctrine.

#### *ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES: CURRENT TASKINGS*

Joint CM doctrine is still evolving; so too the programs of other departments, agencies, and humanitarian organizations. Though ever changing and complicated by the lack of a central tasking authority, what follows is a "quick look" at current CM responsibilities.

DOD. Currently the Secretary of Defense is tasked to provide civilian personnel of federal, state, and local agencies with "training and expert advice" regarding response to WMD threat or employment. Congress has authorized the President to designate an alternate lead agent after 1 October 1999. If a follow-on lead official requests DOD assistance which the Secretary of Defense believes would adversely affect readiness, the Secretary may appeal that request to the President.<sup>17</sup>

CJCS. The Chairman is charged with planning and executing military CM operations in response to incidents regarding NBC weapons and/or their means of delivery (NBC/M). He is also tasked with developing a broad spectrum of CM force capabilities and the military policies, positions, and strategies to support foreign CM operations.<sup>18</sup>

Service Chiefs. The services are directed to organize CM capable forces and develop policy, doctrine and tactics to support emerging joint doctrine.<sup>19</sup> Collectively the services provide a wide array of small, specialized, technical support teams. These teams are organized, trained

and equipped to assess, contain, destroy, or evacuate NBC devices and materials and to mitigate the effects of their use.

Geographic CINCs. The CINCs are tasked by JCS to develop CM plans for their area of responsibility (AOR), establish and train a headquarters element to provide initial incident response, and provide command and control for all follow-on DOD assets in theater. The CINCs are further directed to incorporate NBC/M response requirements into existing HA/DR Functional Plans.<sup>20</sup>

USCINACOM. USACOM plays an important supporting role in foreign CM operations. Specific tasks include identifying, coordinating, exercising, and--when directed by the NCA--deploying CONUS based technical experts to advise and assist geographic CINCs. Furthermore, USCINACOM is directed to establish liaison with other government agencies and with regional non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international organizations (IOs), and regional military commands with CM resources. He is also to ensure that multilateral and bilateral agreements support emergency assistance requirements, and is designated Executive Agent for CM support to CINC exercises. Finally, USCINACOM is tasked with developing an implementation plan to facilitate the integration and employment of CONUS based technical experts in support of geographic CINC's foreign CM operations.<sup>21</sup>

#### Department of State

DOS/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA is a subordinate agency of US Agency for International Development (USAID) with responsibility for US response in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) Operations. OFDA allocates US disaster

relief funds to support relief activities of NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and designated UN agencies. OFDA is also authorized to coordinate directly with DOD for equipment and transportation support.<sup>22</sup>

**Chief of Mission.** Responsibility for implementing and coordinating US policy in any nation resides in the Chief of Mission (COM). The COM receives advice and assistance from other agencies, but retains sole responsibility and authority for implementing US CM actions.

**DOS/Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT).** A standing DOS Political-Military (DOS Pol-Mil) interagency team, the CMRT is designed to assist in all complex technological emergencies. As part of the DOS Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), the CMRT deploys on short notice to provide the Chief of Mission and host government expertise to manage CM problems. The team helps to assess host nation (HN) emergency needs, develop options, identify resources and costs, and assist the COM in coordinating USG, HN, and international CM response operations. Depending on the emergency, the CMRT may range in size from five to fifty members, and include personnel from DOD, USAID, DOE, and other agencies as required.<sup>23</sup>

**Department of Energy (DOE).** The DOE provides technical expertise and equipment to support CM assessment activities in response to radiological emergencies worldwide. This includes, but is not limited to CMRT membership; survey, monitoring, and assessment capabilities; dispersal predictions; and on scene management of support activities.<sup>24</sup>

#### *CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS*

Like any other type of operation, there is no single prescription for success in CM. There are, however, recurring themes which inevitably surface in any discussion of CM requirements,

regardless of who has lead agency responsibility. While far from exhaustive, these themes include:

Rapid response. The scale and nature of NBC effects demand an immediate response capability. This is particularly important with biological emergencies.<sup>25</sup> Regardless of the nature of the problem, many lives and the credibility of governments will rest on the speed of the response. Immediate initial analysis is critical, hence the four hour tether and standby strategic airlift for the FEST. But analysis without the ability to apply corrective action is of little use. Supplies and equipment critical to CM operations must be immediately available in each CINC AOR. CM organizations which cannot respond immediately and effectively run the risk of irrelevance or mission failure in NBC emergencies.

Competence. Professional competence--in deployment, technical assessment, initial actions, HN coordination, technical and medical support actions, crowd control, and public affairs to name a few critical areas--is an absolute necessity. In CM competence leads to credibility. There is little margin for error in this extremely demanding and unforgiving venue. With human and political stakes and the potential for failure extremely high, the reputation of the responders and the prestige of their organization, agency, or command, indeed the credibility of the US government, are very much on the line. Consequence management is not an *ad hoc* mission.

Unity of purpose. At a minimum, consequence management actions outside the continental United States (OCONUS) will involve a host government, a US Chief of Mission, a Joint Task Force for CM operations (JTF-CM), and at least some participation by various relief organizations. Without a common political goal, a shared vision of the end state, and an agreement on measures of effectiveness with which to gauge progress, success will be

problematical. HN leadership will be critical in achieving this unity of purpose, which will grow in difficulty as the number of actors expands.

Unity of effort. "Coordination is not a natural response of UN Agencies, IOs, and NGOs."<sup>26</sup> With dozens, potentially hundreds of such organizations contributing to CM actions, unity of command is out of the question.<sup>27</sup> Unity of effort, however, is both a necessary and attainable goal. To achieve unity of effort US military operations must be synchronized with those of other US governmental agencies, as well as with the other military forces, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs. All CM actions must be mutually supporting and logically sequenced.<sup>28</sup> Command, control, and coordination issues should be clearly defined and addressed by the major players early in CM planning. CM coordinators of all stripes must be sufficiently flexible to include all who can contribute meaningfully to the effort. Failure to include organizations willing and able to render assistance may be paid for in lives lost and policies undermined.

Security. Security is one thing most often needed by agencies and relief organizations to enable them to perform their tasks. According to the UN's January 1994 "Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief," security is a HN responsibility.<sup>29</sup> Should the host nation fail in this regard, foreign troops may be required to provide a safe and stable environment for operations. Introducing foreign troops may, however, heighten tension or even provoke violence. It would certainly give dissident parties focus for complaint, non-cooperation, disobedience, or outright opposition to the government and the program at hand. In such an environment force protection will be a major factor in CM planning.

Non-threatening posture. A small nation with a large CM problem may find itself wondering if the cure is as bad as the disease if suddenly inundated with foreigners. This is

especially true of authoritarian regimes to whom the welfare of the people is of less concern than the threat of "invasion" by foreign troops. The threat could be seen as an overt act to overthrow the regime, or as a more insidious move to erode the regime's credibility by highlighting its inability to respond to the problem. Either way, any perceived threat by the ruling regime is a political problem for the CM force. The perceived threat may also be to a neighboring state which might suspect CM actions as a ruse for staging an attack against them.

CM as a political action. Implicit in the discussion of threats and security is the fact that CM operations are inherently political. The motives for all actions are subject to interpretation and manipulation. As the world's most powerful state, the US is particularly vulnerable to charges of hegemonic designs and the problems resulting from such charges, regardless of the purity of our motives. Like the perception of threat addressed above, a large military CM response may have a significantly different political impact than one in which civilian agencies dominate.

#### *THE PROBLEM: ENDS, MEANS, AND OPTIONS*

DOS is clearly in charge of US efforts in foreign CM operations, but it is the regional CINCs who have the responsibility to plan for and conduct such operations. Yet, despite the importance of "getting it right" in both their defense and CM responsibilities, the CINCs are at a disadvantage in meeting the CM criteria for success. A CINC's knowledge and understanding of his AOR, his command of a wide array of rapidly deployable human and material assets, and his regional authority make him a natural and powerful player in foreign CM operations. There are, however, a number of problems for regional CINCs which are inherent in the CM tasking. Such problems include, but are not limited to the following:

Initial response time. Given current DOD manning levels and limited redundancies of critical command and control equipment items, it is virtually impossible for a CINC or designated subordinate JTF-CM to conduct normal training and operations and still meet stringent CM response times. The FEST can deploy within four hours. Unless the CINC's planners can arrive nearly simultaneously on-site and direct immediate follow-on forces, his ability to shape events or control his own timely reaction will be severely hampered. With CINC CM planners (and vital communications equipment) scattered across the US and their AORs in exercises and operations, a quick response may be more a matter of luck than of design.

Unity of effort. There are notable precedents for military cooperation with HN, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and the UN. Thus far, however, the technical demands and political pressures have been relatively mild. For all their challenges to international cooperation, even Somalia and Rwanda will pale in significance to a nuclear power plant meltdown or biological emergency. CINCs are tasked with coordinating with other CM organizations and are making some progress. Still, the reality is that five different CINCs dealing with hundreds of organizations invites confusion. Even among US government agencies, dealing with many CINCs for planning and exercising may be confusing and over taxing of many small units and organizations.<sup>30</sup> It also burdens each CINC with the huge task of maintaining currency on each organization's capabilities, limitations, reliability, and political acceptability. This duplicative effort among all geographic CINCs and USACOM is not simple, efficient, or productive in the long run. Nor does it carry any important advantage.

Perceptions. CINCs are capable of doing CM and there are many good reasons for them to do so. But they are military actors in a scenario where the introduction of forces could be

counter-productive. Even benign force protection actions can lead to ballooning US military presence, while attacks on military personnel could jeopardize the entire CM effort. By their mere presence military forces can play into the hands of the host government's political rivals as well as terrorist elements. In many situations five hundred westerners in blue jeans and white vehicles will be less threatening than five dozen troops in camouflage and tactical vehicles.

Consistency. Progress made by the military in CM efforts can lead to problems if abruptly halted due to a change in mission.<sup>31</sup> An even greater problem would be the forced withdrawal of US forces due to opposition to our participation in CM operations. With today's shrinking forces and expanding missions, this is a problem which cannot be ignored. Whether due to foreign attacks or domestic pressures, the price of pulling forces out of an ongoing CM effort may be extremely high in casualties, damage to property, and national prestige.

Resources. The CINCs, and their major subordinate commanders, have many other responsibilities and increasingly limited resources. Drains on the attention of commanders and their staffs, on manpower, and on operating funds to cover humanitarian contingencies (not reimbursed as of late) can lead to a real erosion of the nation's military capacity.

Politics. As noted in PDD-56, the military response to a CM emergency may not be the best course of action. CM is an inherently political activity, as is the introduction of US military forces, even when in support of other agencies. Still, "...as long as the CINCs are the only US Government officials with the wherewithal to pull together US interagency actions on a regional basis, they will need to continue to provide the leadership - even while in a supporting role."<sup>32</sup> Thus the current JCS taskings effectively tie the USG to a response which the NSC acknowledges will not always be in our best interest.



## *RECOMMENDATIONS*

Given the elements of successful CM operations and problems with current taskings, the question remains: Just how do we best maximize our CM capabilities without undermining conventional military capabilities? PDD-56 offers insights and a pathway to reach this goal. Recognizing the necessity of adequate training to successfully plan and manage complex contingency operations (read CM), PDD-56 calls for creating "a cadre of professionals" familiar with the interagency planning process to improve the government's ability to manage future operations. It also directs each agency to review its structure, legal authorities, budget, personnel, training and CM procedures to insure the government is learning from experiences. As part of the restructuring it also directs the Deputies Committee to form an Executive Committee (ExCom) to manage day-to-day US participation in complex contingency operations. It further requires a Pol-Mil plan be developed, with ExCom officials tasked within their expertise.<sup>33</sup> These requirements offer a wonderful opportunity to maximize CM capabilities, but current CM efforts will have to be redirected in order to do so.

With military personnel turnover rates and competing priorities being what they are, establishing a core of CM "professionals" in CINC, and especially in MSC staffs, is an unlikely possibility. So too the likelihood of having an authoritative voice with strong operational experience and ties to an operational CM unit on the ExCom. To maximize these opportunities DOD will have to redirect current organizational trends away from the CINCs and towards a new, centralized CM authority.

This new authority should be structured to effect four reforms. First, lessen the burden on geographic CINCs for immediate response while preserving their very important role in regional

CM planning. Second, focus CM planning, preparation, training, and exercises to coordinate more efficiently the activities of all foreign CM players. Third, enable low profile and non-military CM operations where warranted. Finally, enhance cooperation between foreign and domestic CM efforts.

The draft CJCS Instruction on foreign consequence management operations (CJCSI 3214.01) is a step in this direction, but it stops short of achieving each of the suggested reforms. While it gives USCINCCOM greater responsibilities in coordination and support, the instruction does not materially lessen the burden for planning and immediate response placed on geographic CINCs. Nor does it consolidate the current fragmented approach of each CINC coordinating with the myriad agencies and organizations central to foreign CM operations. The instruction does not provide for a non-military CM response, nor does it envision a structure to systematically exchange information and ideas between foreign and domestic CM operations.

A way to build on the foundation laid by PDD-56 and the draft CJCSI would be to establish a standing Joint-Interagency Authority for CM. While the specific organizational structure of such an authority is less important than the concept at this point, a standing Joint-Interagency Task Force (JIATF-CM) may serve as a good point of departure. Such a construct might include the following elements:

Organization. Establish a subordinate JIATF-CM under USCINCCOM. Given its role in domestic CM, its tasking to establish liaison with the full cast of CM players, and its responsibilities for coordination and exercising foreign CM capabilities, USACOM is a logical choice to source a standing JIATF-CM. CM coordination would be further enhanced if all separate service CM forces were placed under USCINCCOM control.

Location. Basing the JIATF-CM in Washington D.C. would produce three important advantages. First it would enable close and continuous interaction with all major CM players, whether USG, UN, or independent organizations. Second, it would allow the JIATF-CM to meet the same deployment timelines as the FEST, thereby enhancing their credibility and utility. Finally, locating in Washington would allow the JIATF-CM direct representation on the ExCom and a role in pol-mil planning for CM emergencies.

Responsibilities. A partial listing of JIATF-CM responsibilities and taskings might include:

1. Plan and execute OCONUS CM operations. This might be done as an independent JIATF-CM, as a JIATF-CM in support of a regional CINC, or through augmenting another CINC staff with designated military and/or civilian personnel.
2. Develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for foreign CM operations and serve as conduit for the exchange of information with domestic CM planners.
3. Lead DOD's CM planning effort, coordinating with and assisting regional CINCs in their CM planning activities. CINCs will still be responsible for regional plans, but will be able to call upon JIATF-CM for technical assistance, coordination with agencies and organizations, and personnel augmentation. The JIATF-CM would assume responsibility for CM planning in those regions not specifically assigned to a regional CINC.
4. Hold regular exercises with USG Agencies, NGOs, PVOs, IOs, and representatives of CINC CM planning cells. Biannual exercises, rotated among CINCs, would lessen demands on small CM organizations, expand exposure to CINC CM cadres who would be invited to participate in all such exercises, and promote understanding and professional bonds between governmental and

private CM players. They would also allow each CINC to exercise his regional CM plan every two to three years, which should be sufficient to maintain currency.

5. Be manned at a level to lead one and support another operation simultaneously.
6. Provide DOD representatives to the CMRT and a rapidly deployable response cell to assist in the initial technical assessment and deployment of follow-on assets.
7. Provide the DOD representative to the ExCom and actively participate in developing the Pol-Mil plan to coordinate CM efforts.
8. Include sufficient civilian personnel in the JIATF-CM organizational structure to enable non-military CM operations if required.
9. Participate in domestic CM planning and execution as directed.

## *CHALLENGES*

A fundamental challenge to the CM community is the seemingly mundane issue of definition. The CM landscape is cluttered with opposing, and ever changing, definitions. Some of these differences are cosmetic, but others will have a profound effect on just what incident rates a CM response, and how the responders will meet the challenge. For instance, under NSC and DOS guidelines another Chernobyl would trigger a CM response. Under draft JCSI guidelines it would not. Faced with such a fundamental dichotomy, CM planners at all levels can only plan for the worst case, using the broadest definition as a basis for their estimates.

Other challenges are illustrated by lessons learned from recent CM exercises. An important finding of Exercise AGILE LION 97 was the degree to which the presence of contaminants complicates a CM response effort. Faced with operating in a radiological

environment, the civilian HA/DR community was unprepared for the task, at least initially. There are few such organizations with any capability or inclination to plan and execute operations in such an environment. Even the US military has little current expertise for large scale operations in a radiological environment, and international standards are inadequate to support coordinated operations.<sup>34</sup> So, even if it is desirable that the US military seek to minimize its CM profile, the reality is that the CM community is not yet ready to make such a major adjustment.

Exercise BOLD ENDEAVOR 97 pointed to several other problems. First was the tremendous burden that planning and executing a CM mission was to a Division Headquarters tasked as JTF-CM. Second was the related burden of preparing a Division staff and all its attachments for operations in a SPECAT environment. Training, equipment, and administrative demands for SPECAT operations are substantial, and maintaining this operational capability over time would be an enormous undertaking.<sup>35</sup> A final, and critical, observation was that the many small, specialized CM units can quickly become exhausted when torn between too many competing JTFs. Establishing a single JIATF-CM would reduce their operations tempo, allow for establishing habitual relationships, and raise the efficiency and productivity of all parties.<sup>36</sup>

## *CONCLUSION*

The bottom line is not that CM is "too hard." It is not. CM is, however, a complex, demanding, and unforgiving mission which requires meticulous, no-notice execution in a variety of emergency venues. Organizing and training to this mission effectively preclude conventional training and operations for combat units tasked with JTF-CM responsibilities. Meeting conventional commitments effectively precludes gaining and maintaining a first class CM

capability. An adequately staffed and funded standing Joint-Interagency CM authority has great potential to enhance US military CM capabilities, enable a non-military CM option, lessen rather than add to demands on regional CINCs, and maximize foreign and domestic CM cooperation. Since major WMD incidents and regional military challenges are a near certainty, preparing to handle both simultaneously is very much in the nation's interest.

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## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CJCS CONPLAN 0400-96) (Washington, D.C.: 31 May 1996), vii.
- <sup>2</sup> BDM Corporation, Transition From Terrorist Event Management to Consequence Management. (Maclean, VA: 31 March 1982), I-4.
- <sup>3</sup> Coordinating Sub-Group for PDD 39, "Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of the USG Forces in Response to an Overseas Counterterrorism Incident," quoted in Department of State (Political-Military) Briefing, "DOS PM Consequence Management," (Washington, D.C.: 12 May 1997).
- <sup>4</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Support To OCONUS Consequence Management Operations CJCS INSTRUCTION XXXX.XX (DRAFT) (Washington, D.C.: 24 November 1997), 3.
- <sup>5</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Support To Foreign Consequence Management Operations (CJCS INSTRUCTION 3214.01) (DRAFT) (Washington, D.C.: 1 May 1998), 5.
- <sup>6</sup> Department of State (Political-Military) Briefing "Department of State: Consequence Management of WMD," (Washington, D.C.: 21 April 1998).
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Joint Pub 3-07-6) (DRAFT) (Washington, D.C.: Undated), I-1.
- <sup>8</sup> President, Executive Order 12148, "Federal Emergency Management," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (20 July 1979), 1278.
- <sup>9</sup> Executive Order 12148, 1279.
- <sup>10</sup> President, Executive Order 12735, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (16 November 1990), 1835-1837.
- <sup>11</sup> President, Executive Order 12930, "Measures to Restrict the Participation by United States Persons in Weapons Proliferation Activities," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (29 September 1994), 1906, 1907.
- <sup>12</sup> President, Executive Order 12938, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (14 November 1994), 2386-2389.

<sup>13</sup> President, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism," Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, (Washington, D.C.: 21 June 1995), 5-9. This dichotomy between preventing and recovering from an attack causes its own set of problems. For a full discussion see Chris Seiple, "Consequence Management: Domestic Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction," Parameters, Autumn 1997, 121, 122.

<sup>14</sup> Public Law 104-201. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Title XIV, "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act," (Washington, D.C.: 23 September 1996), 2718, 2720.

<sup>15</sup> President, White Paper, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," Presidential Decision Directive-56, (Washington, D.C.: May 1997), 1.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>17</sup> Public Law 104-201, 2718.

<sup>18</sup> CJCSI 3214.01 (Draft), A-1

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., A-1, A-2.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., A-4.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., A-4 - A-6.

<sup>22</sup> Joint Pub 3-07-6, II-6.

<sup>23</sup> Department of State Briefing, "Consequence Management of WMD," (Washington, D.C.: 1 April 1998).

<sup>24</sup> Department of Energy Briefing, "DOE Capabilities Brief," (Washington, D.C.: Spring, 1997).

<sup>25</sup> For a discussion on the contrasts between chemical and biological scenarios see Seiple, 121, 122.

<sup>26</sup> Andrew Natsios quoted in Headquarters, USEUCOM, AGILE LION 97 Political-Military Workshop Conference Report, (Stuttgart: Undated), b-10.

<sup>27</sup> 78 PVOs were active in Somalia, with over 100 contributing to relief efforts in Rwanda. USAID has over 350 relief organizations registered. InterAction, a US based consortium of PVOs, has over 100 members operating in some 180 countries. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-08) (Washington, D.C.: 9 October 1996), II-19.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., I-1.



<sup>29</sup> Headquarters, USEUCOM, AGILE LION Summary Review of Workshop Sessions 2 & 3, (Stuttgart: 28 June 1997), Section D.

<sup>30</sup> Captain Christopher P. Smith Memorandum to Commander First Marine Division, "Lessons Learned During Bold Endeavor 97," 24 June 1997.

<sup>31</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, III-25.

<sup>32</sup> William E. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, McNair Paper 37 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 87.

<sup>33</sup> PDD-56, 4-6.

<sup>34</sup> Conference Report for AGILE LION, 3-5, A-1, A-4.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Lessons Learned, Exercise BOLD ENDEAVOR3 97," (DRAFT) (Fort Bliss, TX: June 1997). I MEF, "BOLD ENDEAVOR 97 Consequence Management Lessons Learned", (Camp Pendleton, CA.: 1 July 1997).

<sup>36</sup> Smith Memorandum.

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